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THE LAWYER AS LOVER: ARE COURTS ROMANTICIZING
THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP?
Bruce A. Green*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Lawyers have a special relationship with their clients, in that
lawyers are generally expected to devote themselves to their clients
and their clients’ causes no matter how morally undeserving those
clients or causes happen to be (as long as lawyers do not help their
clients break the law). Lawyers and judges largely take the attorneyclient relationship and its expectations for granted. Not so academics. For some years, moral philosophers and others have contemplated whether and how to justify a professional relationship that appears
to sacrifice the greater public good for the individual client’s benefit.1
Forty years ago, Professor Charles Fried of Harvard Law
School took a swing at this question in an article called, The Lawyer
as Friend.2 Seeking to justify “the ideal of professional loyalty to
one’s client” that is intrinsic to “the traditional conception of the law*
Louis Stein Chair, and Director, Stein Center for Law and Ethics, Fordham University
School of Law. This paper was prepared for a Touro Law School symposium on “Billy Joel
and the Law.” My thanks to Sam Levine for organizing the symposium and inviting me to
participate, and my thanks to him, Susan Saab Fortney, Russ Pearce, Becky Roiphe and Ellen Yaroshefsky for comments on an earlier draft.
1
See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); Rob Atkinson, Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV. 853 (1992); Stephen L.
Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities,
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613; Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional
Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63 (1980) (arguing “for a new conception of professional ethics in
which lawyers must acknowledge personal responsibility for the consequences of their professional conduct”); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L REV.
1083 (1988). See also Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Standard Misconception of Legal
Ethics, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1529 (1984) (discussing and critiquing some moral philosophers’
underlying assumptions about the lawyer-client relationship).
2
Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
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yer’s role,”3 Professor Fried argued that, like a friend or relative, a
lawyer is morally entitled to give special priority to one person’s interests by virtue of the special relationship.4 He characterized a lawyer as “his client’s legal friend” or “limited-purpose friend,” explaining that, “like a friend,” a lawyer acts in another’s “interests, not his
own.”5 Professor Fried acknowledged how friendships differ from
lawyer-client relationships: “the ideal [friendship] is reciprocal” and
not financially motivated.6 However, he regarded these differences
as irrelevant to his argument that the lawyer’s role justifies prioritizing the client’s interests in order to “help to preserve and express the
autonomy of his client vis-à-vis the legal system,” even when the client is morally or socially unworthy.7
One may gain a different perspective on lawyers’ fidelity to
clients if, instead of analogizing lawyers to friends, one compares
lawyer-client relationships to romantic ones – that is, if one envisions
lawyers as lovers. Not lovers in a literal sense: initiating a sexual relationship with a client would be unethical and would get a lawyer into a heap of trouble.8 To adapt Professor Fried’s terminology, imagine the lawyer as a “legal” or “limited-purpose” lover, or as a lover in
the legal system.9
Unlike Fried’s article, this essay is not a philosophical explo3

Id. at 1061.
See id. at 1071.
5
Id. at 1071-73.
6
Id. at 1074.
7
Fried, supra note 2, at 1074. For critiques of Fried’s analysis, see, e.g., WILLIAM H.
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 19-20 (1998); James E.
Fleming, The Lawyer as Citizen, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1702-08 (2002); DAVID
LUBAN, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ ROLES AND
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 106-07 (David Luban ed., 1983) (analyzing Professor Fried's argument
that by serving a client a lawyer is engaged in a moral good); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 108-09
(1978) (challenging Fried’s analogy on the ground, among others, that unlike friends, who
adopt each others’ ends, lawyers adopt clients’ ends but the relationship is not reciprocal);
W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 49-51 (1999).
8
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) (2014) (“A lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client . . . .”). See generally Stacey DeBroff, Lawyers As Lovers: How Far
Should Ethical Restrictions on Dating or Married Attorneys Extend?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 433 (1987); Cheyney Ryan, Lawyers as Lovers: Gold Diggers of 1933 or “I’d Rather You Sue Me than Marry Me,” 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1123 (1996); William K. Shirey, Note,
Dealing with the Profession’s “Dirty Little Secret:” A Proposal for Regulating AttorneyClient Sexual Relations, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 131 (1999).
9
Fried, supra note 2, at 1071.
4
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ration of whether lawyers should be devoted to clients at public expense. Rather, drawing on particular cultural understandings, this essay is a normative exploration of whether lawyers can and should be
devoted to clients not only at the expense of others’ interests but also
at the expense of their own self-interest. In particular, it asks whether
lawyers can and should meet courts’ expectations of loyalty, candor,
and confidentiality.
The argument, here, is that just as pop singers might idealize
attributes such as fidelity and candor in romantic relationships, courts
sometimes romanticize analogous attributes such as loyalty and candor in lawyer-client relationships. Moreover, just as it is unrealistic
to expect lovers consistently to achieve romantic ideals, it may be unrealistic to expect lawyers consistently to achieve analogous professional ideals. Although the analogy between lawyers and lovers will
seem frivolous, it leads to a serious point: courts should adopt a less
idealized rhetoric and express more realistic expectations of the lawyer-client relationship.
II.

FROM THE BILLY JOEL CANON: THE ROMANTIC IDEAL

For insight into the romantic side of the “lawyer as lover”
equation, one can look widely in popular culture, but it seems apt to
look to the canon of Billy Joel, given the popularity of his music.
Some of Billy Joel’s songs are about loners – his Billy the
Kid, for example, “always rode alone.”10 However, many more of his
lyrics are about people in relationships. Some of these relationships
might be described as professional ones – for example, his piano
man’s relationship to the audience.11 But as one would expect of pop
songs, a greater portion of Billy Joel’s lyrics are about people in romantic relationships – not one-night-stands or hookups, but intimate
relationships involving intense feeling and attraction. If the lyrics
resonate with listeners, perhaps that is because they tell us something
we already know about what lovers want and how lovers behave.12
What do lovers want from their counterparts? What do they
10

BILLY JOEL, The Ballad of Billy the Kid, on PIANO MAN (Columbia Records 1973).
BILLY JOEL, Piano Man, on PIANO MAN (Columbia Records 1973).
12
Billy Joel’s lyrics are not, however, considered his strong suit. Nick Paumgarten, Thirty-Three-Hit Wonder, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/ma
gazine/2014/10/27/thirty-three-hit-wonder (observing that “[Joel] states things very plainly,
in the Tin Pan Alley tradition. The lyrics aren’t difficult. Anyway, he is chiefly a melodist”).
11
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value in a relationship? What are the romantic ideals? Often sung in
the first person – in the Billy Joel persona – the lyrics offer expected
answers. The (presumably male) romantic partner wants candor,
starting with honesty: “[h]onesty is . . . mostly what I need from
you.”13 The lover values companionship, constancy and commitment:
“[s]he’s got a way about her/ I don’t know what it is/ But I know that
I can’t live without her.”14 Romances are supposed to endure.
But what do lovers get? Billy Joel’s lyrics suggest that the
romantic ideals are ideals, not expectations and certainly not guarantees. They are not realistically attainable, at least not always. The
Billy Joel canon acknowledges that romantic relationships fail – they
“will not last forever,”15 and they may not even last a day.16 What
begins “with a passionate start” usually ends in “cold remains,”17 and
the idea that the relationship will “go the distance”18 is entirely “a
matter of trust.”19 This is true in two senses. The success of a romantic relationship rests on mutual trust – lovers have to trust each
other and be trustworthy. But even then, one has to trust in its survival – to take it as a matter of faith.
Even before romantic relationships are over, romantic ideals
are hard to achieve. One cannot trust a romantic partner to keep
one’s deepest, darkest secrets: “we all fall in love/ But we disregard
the danger/ Though we share so many secrets/ There are some we
13

BILLY JOEL, Honesty, on 52ND STREET (Columbia Records 1978).
BILLY JOEL, She’s Got a Way, on COLD SPRING HARBOR (Columbia Records 1971);
BILLY JOEL, You’re my Home, on PIANO MAN (Columbia Records 1973) (“Well, I'll never be
a stranger/ And I'll never be alone/ Whereever we’re together that’s my home.”).
15
BILLY JOEL, This is the Time, on THE BRIDGE (Columbia Records 1986) (“This is the
time to remember/ ‘Cause it will not last forever/ These are the days to hold on to/ ‘Cause we
won’t,/ Although we’ll want to.”).
16
BILLY JOEL, This Night, on AN INNOCENT MAN (Columbia Records 1983) (“This night is
mine/ It’s only you and I/ Tomorrow/ Is such a long time away/ This night can last forever”);
see also BILLY JOEL, Until the Night, on 52ND STREET (Columbia Records 1978) (“So many
broken hearts, so many lonely faces/ So many lovers come and gone.”).
17
BILLY JOEL, A Matter of Trust, on THE BRIDGE (Columbia Records 1986); see also
BILLY JOEL, Scenes From An Italian Restaurant, on THE STRANGER (Columbia Records
1977) (“[Brenda and Eddie] lived for a while in a very nice style/ But it’s always the same in
the end/ They got a divorce as a matter of course.”).
18
JOEL, A Matter of Trust, supra note 17.
19
See id. (“You can't go the distance/ With too much resistance/ . . . Some love is just a lie
of the heart/ The cold remains of what began with a passionate start/ . . . But that can’t happen to us/ Because it's always been a matter of trust”); see also BILLY JOEL, Stop In Nevada,
on PIANO MAN (Columbia Records 1973) (“[T]hough she finds it hard to leave him/ She
knows it would be worse to stay/ He wouldn’t understand the reasons/ That make a woman
run away.”).
14
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never tell.”20 The romantic attributes are ideals that may not be fully
attainable even by those who try hard. Lovers may value openness
but do not entirely reveal themselves to each other: “Well we all have
a face/ That we hide away forever/ . . . They’re the faces of the
stranger/ . . . Did you ever let your lover see/ The stranger in yourself?”21 Even when we try to be open, communication is too imperfect: “If I only had the words to tell you/ If you only had the time to
understand/ Though I know it wouldn’t change your feelings/ And I
know you’ll carry on the best you can.”22 Lovers may want honesty,
but: “Honesty is such a lonely word/ Everyone is so untrue/ Honesty
is hardly ever heard.”23 For Billy Joel’s persona, it is often, perhaps
always, impossible to achieve the ideal, to live up to the hopes and
expectations of romantic relationships.
III.

THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP: WHY LAWYERS ARE
LIKE LOVERS?

Are lawyers like lovers? One scholar has argued that law and
love are incompatible.24 But at least with regard to the expectations
that go with these different relationships, lawyers and lovers have
something in common. The romantic ideals, such as commitment
and candor, should seem familiar to lawyers, since these ideals find
their counterparts in the legal profession’s “core” fiduciary values of
loyalty, confidentiality, and candor: they are hallmarks of the lawyerclient relationship.25 Others have previously recognized this, observ20

BILLY JOEL, Stranger, on THE STRANGER (Columbia Records 1977).
Id.
22
BILLY JOEL, If I Only Had The Words (To Tell You), on PIANO MAN (Columbia Records
1973).
23
JOEL, Honesty, supra note 13. Of course, Billy Joel’s songs are decades old. If one
doubts their currency, one only needs Google. If you are exploring confidentiality in romantic relationships, you might ask, “Do you keep your lover’s secrets?,” but what you would
get is advice about how to betray your romantic partner. See, e.g., Mike Cameron, 5 Ways
For Women To Have Successful Married Affairs, THE EC2DISABLED BLOG (Aug. 26, 2013),
http://ec2disabled.com-mike-all-5-ways-for-women-to-have-successful-married-affairs; see
also Lizzie Crocker, Rules David Petraeus Broke: Seven Tips for a Top-Secret Affair, THE
DAILY BEAST (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.thedailybeast.com-articles-2012-11-13-rulesdavid-petraeus-broke-seven-tips-for-a-top-secret-affair. Further, if you are hoping to learn
how to promote candor between romantic partners, be forewarned not to seek advice on
Google about how to “maintain an open relationship.”
24
See generally PAUL W. KAHN, LAW AND LOVE: THE TRIALS OF KING LEAR (2000).
25
Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their
Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1116 (2000).
21
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ing, for example, that lawyers, like lovers, serve as confidants26 and
are expected to be honest.27
Although judges’ descriptions of professional practice are not
universally rosy,28 courts adopt a highly idealized rhetoric when they
speak of lawyers’ fiduciary duties under the common law of agency.29 This was true beginning at least as early as the mid-nineteenth
century30 and continues to the present day. As Professor Wolfram
has noted,31 contemporary judges describing lawyers’ common-law
26

See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser's Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CAL. L. REV. 1887, 1921 (2010) (observing that “information is frequently shared with a few
trusted confidantes--doctors and lawyers, and also spouses, lovers, and friends--under legitimate expectations that these secrets should not be shared with all the world”).
27
See Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Judges
but Were Afraid to Ask, 49 S.C. L. REV. 343, 350 (1998) (indicating that “lawyers, like lovers, matadors, and even presidents, are appraised by whether they cheat along the way”).
28
See, e.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964) (observing that
“[i]n our complex society . . . the lawyer’s opinion can be [an] instrument[] for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar”).
29
See, e.g., Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal Malpractice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 689, 708 (2006) (“As a general concept, the high-sounding
expressions of the fiduciary concept perhaps provide courts with emotive phrases to describe
a kind of low-resolution photo of desired lawyer conduct as well as a somewhat blurry vision
of client vulnerability and trust.”); see also Alice Woolley, The Lawyer as Fiduciary: Defining Private Law Duties in Public Law Relations, 65 TORONTO L. J. 285 (observing that
“[c]ourts invoke the lawyer’s status as a fiduciary rhetorically, infused with the ‘warm glow
of generalities’ rather than analytic rigor”) (quoting Wolfram, supra, at 709). For other notable discussions of the lawyer as fiduciary, see generally Ray Ryden Anderson & Walter W.
Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle,
47 SMU L. REV. 235 (1994); Sande Buhai, Lawyers As Fiduciaries, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553
(2009); Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Does Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137 (1999).
30
See Stockton v. Ford, 52 U.S. 232, 247 (1850):
There are few of the business relations of life involving a higher trust
and confidence than that of attorney and client, or, generally speaking,
one more honorably and faithfully discharged; few more anxiously
guarded by the law, or governed by sterner principles of morality and
justice; and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to see that confidence thus
reposed shall not be used to the detriment or prejudice of the rights of the
party bestowing it.
Id.; see also Galbraith v. Elder, 8 Watts 81, 94 (Pa. 1839). New York’s high court has traced
lawyers’ heightened duties to an 1846 essay by Sir Francis Bacon. See In re Cooperman,
633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994) (“Sir Francis Bacon observed, ‘[t]he greatest trust between [people] is the trust of giving counsel.’ This unique fiduciary reliance, stemming from
people hiring attorneys to exercise professional judgment on a client's behalf–‘giving counsel’−is imbued with ultimate trust and confidence.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
31
Wolfram, supra note 29, at 707.
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duties to clients sometimes draw on Benjamin Cardozo’s 1928 characterization of the fiduciary relationship between business partners
and between co-venturers,32 whose fiduciary duties include “the duty
of the finest loyalty. . . . Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive . . . .”33 Building on this and other early
opinions, one judge wrote around a decade ago:
The relationship existing between attorney and client
is characterized as highly fiduciary, and requires proof
of perfect fairness on the part of the attorney. Specifically, the relationship between attorney and client has
been described as one of . . . most abundant good
faith, requiring absolute and perfect candor, openness
and honesty . . . .34
Another contemporary judge has written: “The standards of the legal
profession require undeviating fidelity of the lawyer to his client. No
exceptions can be tolerated.”35 What courts demand of lawyers –
“the finest loyalty,” “the punctilio of the honor most sensitive,” “absolute and perfect candor,” and “undeviating fidelity”: if one listens
to pop music, aren’t these exactly what one hopes to find in a lover?
In at least one respect, the romantic analogy seems more apt
than Fried’s fraternal one. While one presumably favors one’s
friends over strangers, the ideals of friendship do not preclude taking
account of one’s own interests and of others’ interests when dealing
with friends. Brougham famously said that “an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that
person is his client.”36 The ideals of unqualified self-sacrifice and
single-minded devotion to another expressed by Brougham – and by
the courts – seem more characteristic of romantic than fraternal relationships.
32
See, e.g., Sealed Party v. Sealed Party, No. Civ.A. H-04-2229, 2006 WL 1207732, at
*5, *20-21 (S.D. Tex. May 4, 2006) (holding “that the Client has proven by a preponderance
of the evidence that the Attorney had a continuing fiduciary duty not to reveal confidential
information to others, and that the Attorney violated that duty by issuing the Press Release”)(quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928)).
33
Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546 (emphasis added). “Punctilio” means careful observance.
34
Sealed Party, 2006 WL 1207732, at *6 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
35
Van Dyke v. White, 349 P.2d 430, 438 (Wash. 1960) (emphasis added).
36
2 THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (Joseph Nightingale ed., London, Albion Press
1821). See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’
ETHICS 71-72 (3d ed. 2004) (identifying Brougham’s speech as “[t]he classic statement of
th[e] ideal” of “‘entire devotion to the interest of the client’”).
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But there is an important difference between the expectations
of lovers and lawyers: at least as far as Billy Joel’s lyrics go, no one
really expects lovers to live up to the romantic ideals in the absolute,
at least not for long. He offers a vision of romance in which lovers
are likely to betray, withhold and break up. The judicial conception
of law practice, on the other hand, elevates the romantic ideals to legal commands. It is not enough for lawyers merely to aspire to loyalty or to hold it up as an ideal. Courts tell us we have a duty of loyalty
– indeed, a duty of “undeviating fidelity” – and if we fall short we
may be sanctioned, sued or even, at times, imprisoned.37 As for honesty, courts do not concede that it “is such a lonely word . . . hardly
ever heard” from lawyers, but insist that lawyers behave as fiduciaries with “absolute and perfect candor, openness and honesty.”38
Courts express the expectations of the lawyer-client relationship in
absolute and idealized terms and then expect lawyers to live up to
them.
Of course, courts’ pronouncements may sometimes be dismissed as merely rhetorical flourishes, but not always. Courts sometimes give effect to a duty of loyalty that some would consider unexpectedly demanding.39 One example is the so-called “hot potato
doctrine,” which courts have developed in the context of ruling on
motions to disqualify lawyers based on alleged conflicts of interest.40
In circumstances where it would ordinarily be permissible under the
ethics rules for a lawyer to end an attorney-client relationship – e.g.,
where ending the relationship will not materially prejudice the cli-

37
See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327,
333-42 (1998) (discussing United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), in which
a lawyer was convicted of fraud for concealing a conflict of interest).
38
JOEL, Honesty, supra note 13; Green, supra note 37, at 333-42.
39
See Lindsay R. Goldstein, Note, A View from the Bench: Why Judges Fail to Protect
Trust and Confidence in the Lawyer-Client Relationship - An Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2665, 2691-93 (2005) (explaining that courts sometimes discount
the extent to which, at least from the client’s perspective, trust is necessary to an effective
lawyer-client relationship and, from the lawyer’s perspective, there is a need for at least
some residue of good will).
40
See, e.g., Ex parte AmSouth Bank, N.A. v. Drummond Co., 589 So. 2d 715, 721-22
(Ala. 1991) (stating that “a law firm should not be allowed to abandon its absolute duty of
loyalty to one of its clients so that it can benefit from a conflict of interest that it has created”). See generally John Leubsdorf, Conflicts of Interest: Slicing the Hot Potato Doctrine,
48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 251, 252 (2011) (explaining that a law firm cannot “drop a client like
a hot potato” in order to keep a more lucrative client happy) (quoting Picker Int'l, Inc. v.
Varian Assoc., 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D. Ohio 1987)).
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ent41 – some courts have held that it is impermissibly disloyal for the
lawyer to drop the client for the purpose of representing that client’s
adversary. The explanation for the doctrine is that it is disloyal to
end the relationship in order to be adverse to the client, even under
circumstances where a lawyer would have been permitted to end the
relationship for no reason at all, and even where the lawyer would
have been allowed to represent the adversary if the prior representation had ended naturally.42 Given how easily one may exit a romantic
relationship, notwithstanding prior professions of loyalty and fidelity,
and the acrimony that often follows, it seems fair to say that more is
expected of lawyers than of lovers, at least in this respect.
One might ask whether the courts, as well as lawyers who
embrace the judicial rhetoric, are romanticizing professional values
and virtues, expressing unrealistic expectations.43 For example, focusing on the duty of “absolute and perfect candor” espoused by
some courts, Vincent Johnson has persuasively argued that “[i]f the
phrase . . . is read literally and without qualification, it cannot possibly be an accurate statement of an attorney’s obligations under all
circumstances,” and that in most situations, lawyers’ disclosure obligations should be limited to what is reasonable.44 Leaving aside
whether clients are morally worthy or unworthy, can lawyers realistically achieve the courts’ stated expectations of undeviating fidelity
and perfect candor?

41

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(1) (stating that “a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if . . . withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client”).
42
See, e.g., Celgard, LLC v. LG Chem., Ltd., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24742, at *4-5 (Fed.
Cir. Dec. 10, 2014) (implementing an expansive idea of loyalty in applying the concept that
a lawyer may not be “directly adverse” to a current client – for example, in decisions holding
that a lawyer may not represent a party in a lawsuit against a corporate client’s supplier because the success of the lawsuit will increase the client’s costs) (citing Freedom Wireless,
Inc. v. Boston Comm. Group, Inc., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 32797 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 20, 2006)).
43
Although there is not a single accepted view of the loyalty obligation within the bar,
some lawyers embrace the judicial rhetoric. For an example of the divergence among views
on the appropriate implications and scope of lawyers’ loyalty obligations, compare Lawrence Fox, The Gang of Thirty-Three: Taking the Wrecking Ball to Client Loyalty, 121 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 567 (2012), with James W. Jones & Anthony E. Davis, In Defense of a Reasoned Dialogue About Law Firms and Their Sophisticated Clients, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE
589 (2012).
44
Vincent R. Johnson, “Absolute and Perfect Candor” to Clients, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J.
737, 738-39, 792-93 (2003).
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IMPEDIMENTS TO UNDEVIATING FIDELITY AND PERFECT
CANDOR

Should lawyers be undeviatingly faithful to and perfectly candid with their clients, though lovers need not? Like lovers, lawyers
are subject to pressures, distractions and self-interests that interfere
with their ability to be loyal, forthcoming and trustworthy.45 Beneath
the role of lawyer, as of the lover, we are only human.46 There is a
growing professional literature, drawing on behavioral and social science teachings, exploring how common human failings undermine
lawyers’ ability to achieve professional ideals and expectations.47
Why should courts think lawyers are different and able to live up to
high ideals when romantic partners cannot?
One way lawyers differ from lovers is that, in most cases,
they do not have romantic affection toward their counterparts and
may not have positive feelings at all. Lawyers may have passion for
their work,48 and they may identify – or over-identify – with clients,49
but lawyers do not ordinarily love their clients. On the contrary,
emotional and intellectual detachment from clients is considered a
45

See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Jean R. Sternlight, Behavioral Legal Ethics, 45 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1107, 1129 (2013) (observing that “[l]awyers’ judgments can be influenced by a myriad
of desires - including the desire to satisfy the client, to make partner, to generate fees, to
manage their own cash flow, to win a case, to achieve or maintain a particular reputation or
status, to 'do justice,' or to manage limited time”).
46
See, e.g., BILLY JOEL, Leave a Tender Moment Alone, on AN INNOCENT MAN (Columbia
Records 1998) (“Even though I’m in love/ Sometimes I get so afraid/ I’ll say something so
wrong/ . . . Yes I know I’m in love/ But just when I ought to relax/ I put my foot in my
mouth.”).
47
See, e.g., Tigran Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 58
U. KAN. L. REV. 43, 69-70 (2009) (drawing on social science literature to analyze criminal
defense lawyers’ conflicts of interest); Bruce Green & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Rehabilitating Lawyers: Perceptions of Deviance and its Cures in the Lawyer Reinstatement Process,
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 139, 166- 67, 169 (2012) (discussing relevance of social science research to whether disciplined lawyers should be readmitted to the bar); Andrew M. Perlman,
Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 451, 477 (2007) (discussing relevance of social psychology research showing that “under certain circumstances, we will conform to group opinions and obey authorities who issue illegal instructions”); Robbennolt & Sternlight, supra note 45, at 1112 (applying social science insights in analyzing lawyers’ professional conduct).
48
See Russell G. Pearce et al., Revitalizing the Lawyer-Poet: What Lawyers Can Learn
from Rock and Roll, 14 WIDENER L.J. 907, 919-20 (2005).
49
See John Lande, Lessons from Mediators’ Stories, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2423, 2429
(2013) (“Sometimes lawyers over-identify with their clients. Indeed, sometimes lawyers not
only take on their clients’ one-sided views of the counterparty, but they also develop personal antagonisms with the counterpart lawyers.”).
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professional virtue necessary in order to give objective advice and assistance.50 Lovers may be expected to be blind to each others’ faults
or even make a virtue of them: the Billy Joel persona promises his
romantic partner to love her forever “just the way you are.”51 But
lawyers need not approve of their clients socially or morally.52 Some
have considered whether lawyers should love their clients, not in the
romantic sense, but in a religious, moral, spiritual, or fraternal
sense.53 But, as Abbe Smith put it, in discussing lawyers’ relation50
See Daniel Markovits, What Are Lawyers For?, 47 AKRON L. REV. 135, 139 (2014)
(“[T]he principle of professional detachment . . . appears throughout the formal and informal
ideology of the bar, including prominently in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
For a critique of the concept, see Sofia Yakren, Lawyer as Emotional Laborer, 42 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 141, 150-51 (2008):
[W]hen the legal profession nonchalantly counsels lawyers to invoke detachment in order to advocate zealously regardless of how they feel
about a case or a client, it assumes implicitly either that lawyers are able
to comply without negative consequence, or that it is their professional
obligation to pay a psychological price. Either way, the legal profession
fails to acknowledge explicitly the emotional hardships potentially attending the process of compromising one's personal identity for professional role.

Id.

51

BILLY JOEL, Just the Way You Are, on THE STRANGER (Columbia Records 1977); see
also BILLY JOEL, She’s Always a Woman to Me, on THE STRANGER (Columbia Records 1977)
(“She can kill with a smile, she can wound with her eyes . . . but she’s always a woman to
me.”).
52
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2002) (“A lawyer’s representation of a client . . . does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.”). See generally Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting
Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003) (blaming “intense identification between lawyer and client” for “much in the way of contemporary professional misconduct and
malaise (role confusion, lawlessness, maldistribution of legal services, and positional balkanization of the profession)”); W. Bradley Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification in
Legal Ethics: The Problem of Client Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 987, 991 (2006) (arguing
that “although the constitutive rules of the practice of lawyering permits the exercise of some
limited amount of moral discretion in client selection (and in other aspects of the professional relationship), this discretion ought to be circumscribed to a degree that would be intolerable in ordinary moral life”); W. Bradley Wendel, Moral Judgment and Professional Legitimation, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1071, 1073 (2007) (arguing that lawyers “should refrain from
exercising moral judgment on the basis of non-legal values”).
53
See, e.g., ROBERT K. VISCHER, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND THE MORALITY OF LEGAL
PRACTICE: LESSONS IN LOVE AND JUSTICE (2013); Robert J. Condlin, “What’s Love Got To
Do With It?” - “It's Not Like They're Your Friends for Christ’s Sake”: The Complicated Relationship Between Lawyer and Client, 82 NEB. L. REV. 211, 212-13 (2003) (analyzing writings suggesting from a religious perspective that lawyers should love their clients but concluding that it is preferable for lawyers to respect their clients); Eli Wald & Russell G.
Pearce, What’s Love Got to do with Lawyers? Thoughts on Relationality, Love, and Lawyers’ Work, 17 LEGAL ETHICS 334 (2014) (arguing that lawyers’ traditional premise about
clients is false and that they should embrace the true relational nature).
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ships with clients in a criminal defense practice:
The worst aspect of the idealization of the lawyerclient relationship . . . is the idea that lawyers have to
love their clients. Defenders who claim to love all
their clients are simply not being honest. Not all clients are likeable. Not all clients are easy objects of
empathy or compassion. Some can be downright
loathsome.54
Whatever one might think about the virtue of (chastely) loving one’s
clients, no one would seriously suggest that this is the norm.
Arguably, this distinction cuts in favor of greater expectations
for lawyers than for lovers: emotional attachment and other complexities of romantic relationships create impediments for lovers not
shared by lawyers to maintaining trust, loyalty, fidelity and confidentiality. On the other hand, romantic attraction and affection should
make lovers more motivated than lawyers to achieve high expectations. If the popular conception of romance rightly recognizes that
romantic partners cannot easily maintain undeviating fidelity and perfect candor toward loved ones, how can lawyers be expected to consistently achieve comparable ideals in relationships with clients
whom they do not necessarily like?
Another obvious difference plainly cuts against higher demands on lawyers: whereas lovers conventionally pledge fidelity only
to one another, most lawyers have multiple clients to whom they owe
loyalty. Perhaps, as Brougham suggested, an advocate should think
only about the one client being served at the moment, but that may
not be easy.55 While lawyers should not neglect any given client’s
matter while trying to serve them all, it may be unrealistic to expect a
lawyer at each moment to treat every client with “utmost care.” Loyalty to clients may also be limited by competing obligations to third
parties56 and to the courts.57 Even in the context of advocacy, courts
54

Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego
of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1231-32 (2004).
55
2 THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE, supra note 36, at 8.
56
William H. Simon, The Legal and the Ethical in Legal Ethics: A Brief Rejoinder to
Comments on the Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1002 (1999) (observing that
“unlike the lover’s, the lawyer’s role entails duties to remote others”). This set of obligations generally distinguishes lawyers from other fiduciaries as well. Deborah A. DeMott,
The Lawyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 311 (1998) (“What differentiates lawyers
from the general run of agents is the nature of the duties a lawyer owes to nonclients.”).
57
See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within Twenty-
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themselves recognize that lawyers’ duties to the client are tempered
by competing obligations.58 Courts idealize lawyers’ duties to the
court, just as they idealize lawyers’ duties to their clients.59 The conflicting obligations of lawyers suggests that it would be more difficult
for lawyers to be undeviatingly loyal to their clients than for lovers to
be undeviatingly loyal to their romantic partners.
There is one difference, however, that may unequivocally justify higher expectations for lawyers. Lawyers must qualify for a license, are trained and socialized, and are regulated by multiple authorities,60 the very point of which is to produce lawyers who behave
better than people ordinarily do. One does not need a license to enter
a romantic relationship. There is no such thing as unauthorized practice of love, and one need not possess any qualifications or receive
training. Lawyers are taught to be fiduciaries and, if they lapse, they
risk negative professional and financial consequences. Perhaps lawyers are therefore motivated to tread more carefully because the
stakes are higher for lawyers who cheat on clients than for lovers who
cheat on their romantic partners. This may explain why lawyers
seem to have a better track record than lovers. But professional regulation has its limits,61 and even well-socialized lawyers may not find
it easy or natural to resist pressures and incentives to fall short of the
ideals of the lawyer-client relationship. Rather, professional regulation poses a dilemma for lawyers: being imperfect. Perhaps lawyers
cannot be undeviatingly loyal and honest, and cannot entirely avoid
letting secrets slip out, but they risk professional and financial harm if
they slip up.
First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1263 (2009) (noting that “[t]he
question of how to reconcile an attorney’s loyalty to the client with her duties to her profession and the public is at the center of numerous ethical debates”); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce
A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 45-51 (2005) (arguing that modern legal ethics codes reject extreme partisanship). For a critical view of lawyers’ competing obligations to the court, see James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law,
and the Characterization “Officer of the Court,” 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349 (2000).
58
Cohen, supra note 57, at 352.
59
See, e.g., Steinle, Jr. v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95, 101 (7th Cir. 1985) (arguing that as “an
officer of the court . . . [a lawyer’s] duty to the court is paramount, even to the interests of his
client”).
60
See generally Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation:
Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation--Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L.
REV. 1167 (2003); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV.
799 (1992).
61
See Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 1273 (1998).
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MAY LAWYERS TELL “PRETTY LIES”? THE LEGAL
PROFESSION’S APPROACH

Vol. 32

Do romantic partners really want or need what they say they
want? Billy Joel sings, “I don’t want some pretty face/ To tell me
pretty lies/ All I want is someone to believe.”62 But Billy Joel may
not believe what he sings. He is not necessarily writing lyrics in his
own voice. The Billy Joel persona may be lying to his fictional partner, perhaps as part of a seduction, or lying even to himself. And
even if he truly wants absolute honesty, is that what he needs? Clancy Martin, a philosophy professor who recently authored a book titled
“Love and Lies,” argues that love and absolute honesty are incompatible: “[r]elationships last only if we don’t always say exactly what
we’re thinking. We have to disguise our feelings, to feint, to smile
sometimes when we want to shout. In short, we have to lie.”63
Likewise, with respect to lawyer-client relationships, one
might ask from a normative perspective whether absolute loyalty,
candor and confidentiality are desirable even assuming they are attainable. Concepts such as loyalty, candor and confidentiality have
no fixed, intrinsic meaning. These concepts are constructed by courts
and the legal profession. For the U.S. courts, the fiduciary duties can
sound like almost sacred obligations, absolute and invariable. The
profession tends to construct these duties in more realistic or relative
terms;64 it has more forgiving and qualified expectations of lawyers,
as reflected in the professional conduct rules, for which the bar has
initial drafting responsibility,65 and in bar association ethics opinions
interpreting the rules.66 In the profession’s view, loyalty, candor and
confidentiality are not absolute but should be qualified in light of
62

JOEL, Honesty, supra note 13.
Clancy Martin, Good Lovers Lie, N.Y, TIMES, Feb. 7, 2015, at SR4.
64
This is one of a number of ways in which the bench and bar take conflicting views of
lawyers’ professional obligations. See generally Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar
and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389 (1992); See also Zacharias, supra note 57, at 57-59.
65
See, e.g., D’Andrea v. Epstein, Becker, Green, Wickliff & Hall, P.C., 418 S.W.3d 791,
797 (Tex. App. 2013) (finding that even if a law firm did not violate the applicable conflictof-interest rule by engaging in work for one client that was adverse to another current client,
the firm may be liable for breaching its duty of loyalty because “a violation of the disciplinary rules is not necessary . . . to establish civil liability for attorneys”). For a discussion of
the relationship between the bar and the courts in the process of adopting legal ethics codes,
see Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70
OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 90-97 (2009).
66
For a discussion of the role of ethics opinions, see Bruce A. Green, Bar Association
Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 731 (2002).
63
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others’ interests or even in light of the client’s best interests. Further,
from the profession’s perspective, these duties are not invariable, but
are the default terms of a professional relationship, in that clients can
generally negotiate for greater protection or bargain protections away
to benefit the lawyer.67
Professional conduct rules do not speak explicitly in terms of
loyalty: they do not expressly obligate lawyers to be “loyal” to their
clients or forbid “disloyalty.” The rules restrict lawyers from engaging in representations involving conflicts of interest.68 The accompanying Comment roots this restriction in the concepts of “[l]oyalty and
independent judgment,” which are said to be “essential elements in
the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”69 But the correlation between
disloyalty and conflicts of interest is not necessarily exact. The core
of disloyalty involves either acting against the client’s interests with
regard to the matter in which the client is represented or acting adversely to the client generally. Some courts speak of a “fiduciary duty to avoid conflicts of interest,”70 but the equation between loyalty
and the avoidance of conflicts seems questionable, at least if one has
in mind how professional conduct rules define conflicts. The conflict
of interest rules are prophylactic rules,71 and they are less about loyalty than about competence and confidentiality: the rules require lawyers to avoid situations where interests other than those of the client
may lead lawyers to represent the client inadequately or misuse the
client’s confidences. This is made clear by provisions allowing a client to consent to the lawyer’s representation, notwithstanding a conflict of interest, as long as the lawyer can provide “competent and diligent representation.”72
Insofar as the rules also address loyalty implicitly and in part,
their concern may be with the client’s perception rather than with the
reality. In many situations, clients may give “informed consent” to a
67
See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84
VA. L. REV. 1707, 1753-56 (1998); Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 541, 585 (2009) (observing that “[o]ne view of legal ethics regulation is that the
codes ordinarily set a baseline of default rules that lawyers and clients can bargain around,”
as in the case of the conflict-of-interest and confidentiality rules).
68
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002).
69
Id. at cmt. 1.
70
See, e.g., In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 592 (3d Cir. 2009).
71
Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 71, 104-05 (1996).
72
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(1) (1983).
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lawyer’s conflict of interest under the rules, because the rules address
risks of harm that may never occur.73 Further, the possibility of client
consent is inconsistent with the concept to “undeviating fidelity” that
courts attribute to the lawyer-client relationship.
In the course of interpreting professional conduct rules, bar
association committees often refer to the “duty of loyalty,”74 but typically look to the rules themselves to illuminate its scope, with the result that the legal profession sometimes approves of conduct that is
harmful to a client and that some would intuitively consider disloyal.
In other words, disloyalty is not necessarily forbidden under the professional conduct rules. For example, one might consider it “disloyal” for a lawyer to espouse personal views that are adverse to the client’s interests or to seek to reform the law in ways that would
prejudice the client, but the bar’s position is that because the rules do
not proscribe this conduct, clients are not always entitled to expect
their lawyers to avoid prejudicing them outside the context of the
lawyer’s professional work.75 Likewise, one might consider it disloyal for a lawyer to represent a client’s economic competitor, but the
bar says that a lawyer ordinarily may do so, because this falls outside
the restraint on “direct adversity.”76 Even more contestably, the ABA
has concluded that a lawyer may help one client write another client
out of his will, regardless of how the lawyer’s conduct is perceived
by the client whose expectations are thwarted with the lawyer’s aid.77
Perhaps the most compelling rejection of the judicial idea of “undeviating fidelity” is the professional conduct rule listing situations in
which a lawyer may seek to end a lawyer-client relationship, including when “the client insists upon taking action . . . with which the
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement,” deliberately fails to pay the
lawyer’s fee, or “fails to cooperate in the representation.”78
73

Id. at (b)(4).
See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001)
(stating that “[l]awyers owe to clients, unlike third persons, a duty of loyalty that transcends
the lawyer's convenience and interests”).
75
See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1997-3 (“The obligation of loyalty
to the client applies only to a lawyer in the discharge of professional duties and implies no
obligation to adopt a personal viewpoint favorable to the interests or desires of the client.”)
(quoting Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-17); see also Tanina Rostain, Sheltering
Lawyers: The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77
(2006).
76
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6.
77
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-434 (2004).
78
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4)–(5), (7).
74
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As with “loyalty,” the professional conduct rules do not speak
explicitly of “candor” to clients. Nor do they, by their terms, establish an affirmative duty, as a matter of candor, to tell clients what
they might want to know. The rules generally require truthfulness
but not candor.79 One relevant professional rule, titled “Communication,”80 requires lawyers to “reasonably consult with the client . . .
keep the client reasonably informed . . . comply with reasonable requests for information . . . [and] . . . explain matters to the extent reasonably necessary.”81 Even the accompanying explanation says nothing about candor per se, but observes that “[r]easonable
communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the
client effectively to participate in the representation.”82 Another relevant professional conduct rule forbids dishonesty and deceit toward
others, including clients,83 but it too is not a candor rule; it does not
require lawyers to volunteer information that the client would want to
know.84
In interpreting professional conduct rules, bar association
committees take a qualified approach to the idea of candor to the client.85 While judicial opinions sometimes say that lawyers must disclose everything they know of importance to the client,86 the professional duty to communicate is qualified. For example, an ethics
opinion recognizes that the extent of the lawyer’s disclosure obligation is limited by the duty to keep other clients’ secrets, and that lawyers may continue a representation even when lawyers possess some
relevant information they can never tell the client.87
79

See City of Livonia Empl. Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2013)
(discussing Kant’s famous emphasis on the difference between the duty of truthfulness and
the duty of candor).
80
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2014).
81
Id.
82
Id. at R. 1.4 cmt. 1.
83
MISCONDUCT, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (c) (2015).
84
Another honesty rule provides that “a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
4.1 (a) (2014). The rule apparently does not apply to communications with clients. See
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Bolusky, 23 P.3d 268 (Okla. 2001).
85
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2015).
86
See, e.g., Baker v. Humphries, 101 U.S. 494, 500 (1879) (“It is the duty of an attorney
to advise the client promptly whenever he has any information to give which it is important
the client should receive.”); Schweizer v. Mulvehill, 93 F. Supp. 2d 376, 397 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (“Negligent or willful withholding of information material to the client's decision to
pursue a course of action is a breach of the duty of due care.”).
87
See N.Y. City Bar Ass’n., Formal Opinion 2005-02: Conflicts Arising From Possession
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The bar’s critics have emphasized the influence of professional self-interest on professional self-regulation,88 and one might be
tempted to credit professional self-interest for rules that are more forgiving and less demanding than judicial pronouncements on the lawyer-client relationship. But it is equally plausible that the bar has a
clearer picture of the lawyer-client relationship and a better understanding of what is desirable and realistically achievable.
VI.

DIFFERING VIEWS OF THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

At least in theory, it is possible to justify the occasional mismatch between common-law fiduciary duties and professional conduct rules that address the same aspects of the lawyer-client relationship. The courts’ pronouncements are typically made in lawsuits
involving lawyers’ potential civil liability where the underlying question is how to allocate responsibility for financial harm to the client
whose lawyer failed to achieve the ideal of loyalty, candor, or confidentiality.89 One might choose, in some situations, to allocate the
cost to the lawyer even when the lawyer was not morally blameworthy for shortcomings. One might adopt a more forgiving standard to
govern the same professional conduct for disciplinary purposes, because lawyers should not be punished unless their conduct is blameworthy.90
of Confidential Information of Another Client: The Committee on Professional and Judicial
Ethics, 60 The Record 450, 461-62 (2005). The bar opinion acknowledged judicial decisions
taking a more expansive view. Id. at 462-63 (citing Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1999); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler
Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305 F.3d 120, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2002)).
88
See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 639, 641 (1981); Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Obligations Seriously: A Look at
American Codes of Professional Responsibility Through a Perspective of Jewish Law and
Ethics, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 165, 166-68 (2007); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers:
A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 691 (1981); Larry E.
Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1708
(1998).
89
The lawyer’s fiduciary duties may also underlie actions to disgorge attorney’s fees for a
breach of duty, see note 92, infra, or to enjoin a lawyer from engaging in conduct that would
entail a fiduciary breach. See, e.g., Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602
A.2d 1277, 1279, 1284, 1287 (Pa. 1992).
90
Courts sometimes say that attorney discipline is meant to protect the public, not to punish lawyers, but it would be unrealistic to suggest that punishment is not among the courts’
objectives. See generally Stephen Gillers, Lowering the Bar: How Lawyer Discipline in
New York Fails to Protect the Public, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 485 (2014); Green
& Moriarty, supra note 47, at 145.
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There are at least two reasons why this explanation is unpersuasive or, at best, incomplete, however. First, opinions rarely
acknowledge that fiduciary duties can differ from disciplinary duties
because of the different procedural contexts in which these duties are
elaborated and the different consequences of finding an impropriety.91 Second, the fairness of making a lawyer bear the cost of harmful
conduct does not explain why courts order forfeiture of attorneys fees
for breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty that cause no financial
harm.92 Courts assume that clients are entitled to loyalty and that disloyalty is itself a wrong. Decisions on lawyers’ fiduciary duties set a
normative standard wholly apart from concerns about the allocation
of risk or about financial harm.
The rhetoric about fiduciary duty does not inevitably lead to
unrealistically high standards. Sometimes, despite their soaring rhetoric, courts look to the professional rules and understandings to give
meaning to the fiduciary duties. Courts often look to the confidentiality and conflict-of-interest rules, in particular, to set the contours of
the fiduciary duties of confidentiality and loyalty.93 It might be argued that, in some of these situations, the relevant rules are prophy91
Maritrans GP, Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1279, 1284, 1287
(Pa. 1992), is an interesting opinion that discussed the difference between fiduciary duties
and disciplinary rules. In this case, the court held that a breach of the duty of loyalty could
be found even when the conflict of interest rules did not proscribe the conduct in question,
and noted examples of earlier decisions in which courts were ahead of the ethics rule drafters
in proscribing conduct. The court equated “loyalty” with the obligation to avoid conflicts of
interest, but made clear that even when the ethics rules did not proscribe a conflict of interest, courts could enjoin the representation to enforce the fiduciary duty. The opinion is in
tension with the apparent premise of ethics rule drafters that the ethics rules are generally
more demanding than the civil liability standards and therefore should not necessarily by
adopted as a basis of civil liability. See ABA Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Preamble and
Scope, at 20 (the Rules “are not designed to be a basis of civil liability” although “a lawyer’s
violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct”).
92
See Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 77 (3d Cir. 2006); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229,
232, 240 (Tex. 1999) (“[A]n attorney [or any fiduciary] who breaches his fiduciary duty to
his client may be required to forfeit his right to all or part of his fee.”); Rice v. Perl, 320
N.W.2d 407, 411 (Minn. 1982).
93
See, e.g., Diversified Group, Inc. v. Daugerdas, 304 F. Supp. 2d 507, 511 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (confidentiality rule); Schweizer v. Mulvehill, 93 F. Supp. 2d 376, 404-05 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (conflict rules); Estate of Re v. Kornstein Veisz & Wexler, 958 F. Supp. 907, 925-26
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (conflict rules). Courts are especially likely to defer to the confidentiality
rules, which include exceptions that are predicated, in part, on analogous attorney-client
privilege doctrine and in part on professional judgments about situations in which lawyers
should have discretion to disclose client confidences for public-policy reasons. Thus, courts
do not describe a disciplinary duty of “utmost” or “strictest” confidentiality comparable to
their descriptions of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and candor.
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lactic rules that restrict conduct that should not be reached by agency
law – for example, that failing to obtain the client’s consent to an
otherwise permissible conflict of interest under the professional conduct rule is not necessarily “disloyal” as a matter of agency law, and
that the problem is one of inadequate disclosure. In these instances,
one might argue, lawyers do not deserve to face civil liability on top
of potential professional discipline. Even if this is the case, the lawyer is not being held to an unrealistically high standard as a matter of
fiduciary duty, but is held to the preexisting disciplinary standard.
There is a risk, however, that in drafting professional conduct
rules, the bar will defer to the courts’ idealized view of the lawyerclient relationship. That is a possible explanation for the development of Rule 1.7(a)(1) of the ABA Model Rules, which forbids a
lawyer from representing a party adversely to a current client without
the other client’s consent.94 The rationale for the rule is that appearing adversely to one’s client is disloyal. But, according to Professor
Bussel, this principle was recognized only recently in the U.S. jurisprudence and is not recognized today in some common-law legal systems.95 The bar drafted professional conduct rules expressly forbidding a lawyer from appearing against a current client only after courts
began to read this restriction into more vaguely worded conflict-ofinterest provisions.
There is also a risk that the courts’ idealized view will influence their approach to professional discipline, notwithstanding the
bar’s contrary views. Consider, for example, a New York disciplinary action, In re Holley.96 The lawyer in question mistakenly accommodated a reporter’s request for a copy of a document filed in a
lawsuit in which the lawyer’s firm represented a party.97 The lawyer
was uninvolved in the lawsuit and unaware that the document was
filed under seal.98 Disciplinary authorities brought a sanction proceeding based not on the lawyer’s inadvertent violation of the court’s
sealing order but on his inadvertent disclosure of the client’s confidential information.99
At the time, the relevant confidentiality rule cut lawyers some
94
95
96
97
98
99

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1).
Daniel J. Bussel, No Conflict, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 207, 207-08, 211-12 (2012).
729 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2001).
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 130-32.
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slack. It did not protect all information relating to the representation,
but allowed disclosure of non-privileged information when the disclosure would not harm or embarrass the client and was not of particular concern to the client. 100 Moreover, the rule did not cover unwitting disclosures of confidential information, but only “knowing”
disclosures.101 If the court document were publicly available, as the
lawyer had assumed, there would have been no problem with sparing
the reporter a trip to the courthouse by acceding to the reporter’s request. So the implicit question in the case was whether lawyers must
exercise utmost care to protect clients’ confidences.
Both the lawyer-referee who heard the Holley case and four of
the five members of the volunteer panel that subsequently reviewed
the referee’s recommendation concluded that the lawyer’s mistaken
conduct was not a sanctionable breach of duty.102 The state court rejected this view, however, and publicly sanctioned the lawyer.103 Declining to be bound by the terms of the confidentiality rule, the court
held that the lawyer’s “failure to take adequate precautions to safeguard confidential materials of a client, even if considered unintentional, was careless conduct that reflects adversely on his fitness to
practice law.”104
Holley illustrates two problems with the courts’ romanticization of the lawyer-client relationship. First, courts and others may
take the soaring judicial rhetoric too seriously. Courts may treat lawyers with undue harshness, enforcing unrealistic or unfair expectations that fail to take account of lawyers’ human fallibility, the pressures under which lawyers function and the competing interests that
they legitimately serve.105 One can understand imposing civil liabil100

N.Y. Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 4-101(a). The contemporary counterpart is
N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.8 (2009).
101
N.Y. Code of Prof’l Responsibility DR 4-101(b).
102
729 N.Y.S.2d at 130-31.
103
Id. at 133.
104
Id. at 132 (citing Matter of Marrin, 622 N.Y.S.2d 255 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1995)).
105
This risk is exacerbated because courts are not obligated to defer to the drafters’ intent
in interpreting disciplinary rules, as they would ordinarily be in interpreting statutes. Rather,
because courts themselves promulgate the disciplinary rules, they have latitude to interpret
the rules to effectuate their view of sound regulatory policy. See generally Bruce A. Green,
Doe v. Federal Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55 BROOK. L.
REV. 485 (1989). Sometimes this will mean limiting the apparent reach of a rule. But this
may also mean expanding the rule’s apparent reach to give effect to the perceived “spirit” or
purpose of the rule. See Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics
Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 77 TUL. L. REV. 527, 531 (2003).
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ity on Holley for any harm he caused, on the assumption that he
ought to have born the cost. But from both the rules’ ex ante perspective and the ex post perspective of the lawyers who reviewed the
evidence, his conduct was understandable and not deserving of moral
opprobrium. Likewise, there is a risk that clients reading what courts
write will develop unrealistic expectations of lawyers. In addition,
lawyers may develop unrealistic expectations of themselves and
therefore suffer the stress of trying to live up to an unrealistically
high ideal.
Second, the inconsistent approaches to the lawyer-client relationship can cause confusion for courts, lawyers, and others.106 It
may not always be clear to judges which standards to apply in a given
situation – for example, whether to employ the professional rules as
interpreted by the bar or whether to interpret fiduciary duties independently and more demandingly. It may also be unclear to lawyers
where to look for guidance regarding the standards governing their
conduct.
VII.

CONCLUSION: FRIENDS, LOVERS AND LAWYERS

Lawyers have a special relationship with clients that gives rise
to an expectation that they treat clients differently from strangers.
Analogizing lawyers to friends or lovers may help explain this expectation, but there may be little need to explain. Lawyers’ right and obligation to put clients’ interests over those of the general public is
probably not seriously contested.
At least for lawyers, the hard questions revolve around the extent and limits of the loyalty, candor and confidentiality duties. On
these questions, it is not particularly illuminating to say that a lawyer
is like a friend or lover. For one thing, the expectations of romance
are almost certainly not universal: Billy Joel’s lyrics express one vision, but not the only one. Even if there were a consensus on the duties of lovers, there is no reason why they should be the same for
lawyers. Whatever the commonalities may be, lawyers are not lovers, but fiduciaries in an inherently asymmetric, nonexclusive, and
ordinarily passionless relationship that is often short-lived by design.
On reflection, one might also question the utility of analogiz-

106

See Zacharias, supra note 57, at 17 (discussing the costs of divergent professional
standards).
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ing lawyers to other fiduciaries.107 Fiduciaries are not all identical.
Lawyer-client relationships are not reciprocal, unlike the relationships among co-venturers and business partners. Lawyers are licensed and subject to judicial regulation that takes account of duties
to others aside from clients. There is no reason why lawyers’ fiduciary duties to clients should necessarily be identical to the duties of
one business partner to another. Justice Cardozo’s dictum, assuming
it is not excessive even for co-venturers and business partners, may
not fit equally for lawyers and other fiduciaries, of which there are
many, including marital partners.108
Labeling lawyers as “fiduciaries” and then invoking highflown language about fiduciary duties is not a reasonable way to decide how lawyers should behave. The practice of law is too complicated and contextual.109 Courts sometimes recognize this. Through
the power to regulate the bar, courts adopt professional conduct rules
that reflect more nuanced views of lawyers’ obligations. The rules
are ordinarily drafted by the bar, which might be expected to take account of the practical realities of the attorney-client relationship but
might also be unduly concerned with lawyer-self-interest. This may
or may not be the best way to determine lawyers’ duties to clients for
purposes of civil liability and discipline, but surely this is better than
romanticizing the lawyer-client relationship in judicial prose. When
it comes to ascertaining the scope of lawyers’ fiduciary duties, courts
should employ analyses, not just analogies.

107

See, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879 (noting that fiduciary principles differ across different fiduciary relationships); but see D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399,
1400 (2002) (attempting “to craft a unified theory of fiduciary duty”).
108
See generally Alexandria Streich, Spousal Fiduciaries in the Marital Partnership:
Marriage Means Business but the Sharks Do Not Have a Code of Conduct, 34 IDAHO L. REV.
367, 383 (1998).
109
See Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 357, 363 (1998); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional
Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149, 149 (1993); David B.
Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1145, 1163 (1993).
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